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Corporate governance models
 United States
 Great Britain
Germany
Japan
Continental European countries
Mkt 
oriented
(arm’s length 
based)
Bank
Oriented
(relationship-
based)
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Corporate governance models
Typical form of control Shareholders
US, UK Public company Small shareholders
Institutional
investors
Germany Large shareholder Banks (big comp.), 
Family (small comp.)
Japan Keiretsu
Cross-ownership
Banks
Prof. Marco Bigelli  - University of Bologna
Germany
(Franks-Mayer, RFS 01)
Universal bank
Major shareholders 
Other companies
Families
Banks
Banks major vote-holder thanks to proxies
Outsiders attempt to take control by seeking to 
acquire one or more block of shares (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist JCF ’01)
There were only 4 hostile takeovers of German firms 
in the second half of the 20th century
EU takeover directive transplanted in a way to protect 
German companies from hostile takeovers
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…Germany
Universal Bank 
(Shares + proxies)
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Japan
Keiretsu: network of companies with a 
main bank
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Japan
Advantages:
- internal capital market
- soft solutions for financial distress
Disadvantages:
-No mkt for corporate control
-Banks risk to go broken
Financial Institutions are the most 
important block-holder (Prowse JF ’92)
Internal capital markets
Long term relationships and no mkt 
myopia (high R&D)
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US and UK
Managers own only 2-3% of company shares
Mutual and pension funds “vote with their feet”
Focus on mkt price and short-term results
Mkt myopia (Stein JPE ’88; QJE ‘89)
Lower R&D expenses
Agency costs of separation of ownership from 
control. Management versus shareholders
Public company
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Agency Theory
Agency contract: 
A Principal (shareholders) hire an Agent 
(managers) in order to act in their 
interests (max shareholders’ value)
But:
 discretionary behavior
 asymmetric  information
 asymmetric distribution of results
Disallignement of interests
Agency 
costs
Prof. Marco Bigelli  - University of Bologna
Agency costs from separation of 
ownership and control: seminal studies
Smith (1776)
Berle and Means (1932)
Jensen and Meckling (1976)
Agency costs of debt and equity
Agency costs of equity due to the 
separation of ownership and control
Agency costs affect firm’ value:
Monitoring costs
Bonding costs
Residual loss (perquisites, private benefits)
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Examples of extravagant private benefits
Adelphia Communications
In the 2004 Adelphia securities fraud trial, prosecutors alleged that founding CEO John 
Rigas twice requisitioned company aircraft to deliver a Christmas tree to his daughter (the 
second flight became necessary after the first tree was rejected as unsuitable), while 
Rigas’s son Timothy, the company’s chief financial officer, repeatedly made company 
planes available to Australian actress-model Peta Wilson in a futile attempt to ‘‘impress’’ 
her (Yermack, JFE, 2006)
RJR – Nabisco
Burrough and Helyar (Barbarians at the Gate, 1990, pp. 93-94) provide an account of 
managers’ aircraft use at RJR-Nabisco, which before its 1991 leveraged buyout 
maintained an ‘‘RJR Air Force’’ of ten aircraft. The planes were flown by a squad of 36 
company pilots, housed in ‘‘the Taj Mahal of corporate hangars,’’ and made available for 
use by CEO F. Ross Johnson to a range of friends, celebrities, golf instructors, and family 
pets (one of whom was listed on a passenger manifest as ‘‘G. Shepherd’’). The authors 
write that ‘‘the jets were a symbol of the increasingly fuzzy line between what constituted 
proper use of a corporate asset and what constituted abuse’’ (Yermack, JFE, 2006).
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Executives’ extravagance
Rjr Nabisco Ceo and  Director  speech from the movie 
“Barbarians at the gate”
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Agency costs and alignment of interests
alignment of interests (JM, 76)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
alfa
Q
Managers own 
100%
The higher is the managers’ ownership the higher is the 
alignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers
Hence, JM expects a linear relationship between 
managerial ownerhip (alfa) and firm’s performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q)
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Internal and external solutions for 
reducing agency costs from O/C separation
 Agency costs =>  efficiency
 mkt for products
 mkt for managers
 mkt for corporate control
 Board of directors
 Debt and Agency costs from FCF
 Incentive schemes
Active institutional investors
External
Solutions
Internal
Solutions
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Market for products and
Market for managers
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 Inefficient companies will progressively have a 
lower market share and will eventually be out of the 
market (Hart,83)
 Even when it works, its action comes too late, 
when all wealth has been destroyed and efficiency 
can’t be restored
It does not work in case of monopolies 
Italian Ferrovie dello Stato or Rai
It does not work in close economies
Mkt for products
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Mkt for managers (Alchian Demsetz, AER ‘72)
Fama (‘80): managers have reputational capital
 efficient mkts => bad performance => lower stock price
 Active board  in removing bad managers (needed internal 
competition, non-executive directors, etc.)
Bad managers removed 
• No easy to remove high managers
• The higher the position the older the age (reputation 
effect less important)
•Board not enough active
Mkt for managers
Actually, this force is not too effective as:
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Market for Corporate Control
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Mkt for corporate control
 Manne ( JPE ‘65), Jensen Ruback (JFE ‘83)
 public company
 efficient mrkets 
Agency costs => Price down
M&A 80s (Jensen, 93):
$ 2.6 trillion
Avg premium paid: 41%
750 billion $ value creation
MSV(89): Low 
performance 
(active board . or 
M&A)
poison pills, antitakeover laws
Case: RJR 
Nabisco
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“Greed is good “and helped saving the  
Corporate America”
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Entrenchment theory
 The threat of a takeover may induce managers to be 
more efficient not to risk to be taken over and 
removed
For higher values of managerial ownership 
managers become more entrenched and difficult to be 
removed (for alfa > 25%, hostile takeovers were never 
successful). The relationship between firm’s efficiency 
and managerial ownership may not be monotonic 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983) since:
Agency costs depend on two forces:
Alignment of interests
Managerial entrenchment
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First empirical study: Morck, Schleifer, Vishny (JFE,88)
Empirical evidence on firm’s 
performance and managerial ownership 
However, is ownership structure to influence 
performance or the reverse?
12
Prof. Marco Bigelli  - University of Bologna
Takeovers when the break-up value is 
greater the ongoing value
